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Abstract
Theory of mind refers to the ability to conceive of the mental lives that underlie
behavior — an ability that supports virtually all interpersonal interaction. The development
of theory of mind has been attributed to various cognitive, social and environmental factors.
The possession of theory of mind in toddlers has been a widely disputed topic, viewed as
contingent on their understanding of false-belief as demonstrated in a standard false-belief
task. However, recent studies suggest that the standard task may be a weak indicator for
various reasons. It may not encompass what young children are truly capable of. Some
research shows that by adjusting the demands or context of the standard tasks, children have
a better chance of succeeding at them, thereby demonstrating aspects of theory of mind at a
younger age. This study argues that naturalistic observations of toddlers’ daily behavior
suggest that young children may possess an awareness of mental states that ranges in
availability depending on the context.
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1. Introduction
I have often wondered about these moments of clarity in which we somehow
understand, without explicit knowledge, the intentions of other people. How can we
persuade, predict, and empathize; how can we infer information from other people’s
behavior, react and simply make sense of it? The essence of my inquiry points at that which
underlies virtually all social relationships however intimate or distant, and it revealed itself in
this very exploration of the insights that human beings have into other people’s minds. The
inquiry is a longstanding one that spans decades of investigation, analysis and theorization by
philosophers and psychologists alike, piecing together the history of thought and philosophy
of the mind.
It is our very conception of the mind, our own mind and therefore the distinct minds
of others, that allows us to comprehend, explain and predict other people’s behavior. Without
this capacity to infer other people’s reasonings, notions that some of us might take for
granted like understanding social cues or other people’s beliefs, desires, opinions and
intentions would be indecipherable. If we were to see someone frowning, we could assume
the mental state sadness, disappointment or something of the like. We attribute meaning to
the action of frowning, and connect it to an inexplicit emotional state. This capacity to
apprehend the connection between someone’s behavior and their mental states is thanks to a
possession of theory of mind.
The term theory of mind is indicative of its definition. To have a theory of mind, in its
most basic sense, is to possess the theory that human beings have mental existences and that
these existences underlie behavior. With this comes the understanding that minds are unique
and account for differences in belief, desire, hope, fear and the like. It also means that
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humans can share and adopt other perspectives, an ability that some believe to have arisen
with the advent of thought (Matravers, 2017).
More recent work that focuses on the human capacity to share mental states is
mirrored in Piaget’s earlier work on children’s perspective taking abilities and his ideas about
egocentrism (Doyle, 1987). Piaget suggested that very young children appear unable to
imagine a situation from another person’s point of view, that the way the child themselves
experiences the world is also the way everyone else does. In exploration of these ideas, he
developed tasks that tested a child’s awareness of spatial perspective, that is, how things
appear depending on where a person is located. Thus, these ideas were being explored long
before the advent of the term in the late 1970’s by David Premack and Guy Woodruff in their
research with chimpanzees (De Bruin, 2014), and certainly long before the burst of theory of
mind research in the past two decades.
That humans possess theories of mind is not questionable. What is an area of inquiry
and debate, however, is the nature of the existence of theory of mind in the youngest among
us — children. What do infants and toddlers understand about other people’s minds? When
do they really start to think about other people’s thoughts and feelings? Do very young
children have a theory of mind at all, and therefore how is theory of mind defined? Finally,
how can we explore the answers to these questions and how have they been explored in the
past?
This body of work reviews some of the existing literature that seeks to decipher the
answers to these questions within the infant and toddler years. The reason for this age
limitation, other than the need to remain within the scope of this project, is for the sake of its
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controversial nature and relatively recent area of study3. In the past two decades, theory of
mind research has made significant connections between the social, cognitive and linguistic
realms of child development. These domains have been used to explain the theory of mind
phenomenon and the motors that drive its development. Therefore, the following discussion
of theory of mind will explore definitions, functions, potential processes of acquisition and
development through various theoretical lenses. Some of the research that has already been
done to investigate these questions and ideas will be highlighted. This precedes the second
portion of this thesis, which includes a task carried out with seven two-year-old students in
the afternoon class in the Early Childhood Center. The aim was to attempt to apply this
verbal task to the two-and-a-half-year-old child and to explore their perspective taking
abilities in the particular context of this play-based school. Naturalistic observations follow
the task discussions to further elucidate the nature of the children’s insights into mental states
as well as their level of false-belief comprehension at this particular point in their lives.

Indeed toddlerhood was at one point referred to as the ‘dark age’ in theory of mind research (see Meltzoff et
al, 1999).
3
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2. Literature Review
2.1 False Belief
An area of theory of mind research that has been considered to be integral to our
understanding of it in young children is the ability to attribute false belief to another person.
A test that determines a child’s comprehension of false belief — a false-belief task —
requires the participating child to make a claim about another person’s mistaken belief. To
attribute false belief is to understand (1) the difference between the subjective mind and the
objective world, (2) that another person could have false knowledge about reality, and (3)
that another person could have a belief different from the child’s own. It is a cognitive
turning point at which time the child will theoretically display their particular conception of
mind and reality and their ability to attribute meaning to mentalistic terms like ‘believe’ and
‘think’ (Origgi, 2015). Indeed, success on false-belief tasks marks an important milestone in
the development of theory of mind. As a result, some believe that it also marks the beginning
of a coherent theory of mind in general, that it is the point at which children begin to
understand that cognitive processes govern behavior.
The classic false belief task, developed by Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983)
involves a change in location of an object. The child watches a participant observe an object
in a particular location. Then they watch the participant leave the scene. The object is then
moved to another location and as the participant returns to the scene to look for the object,
the child must answer where they predict the participant will look for the object. In theory,
older children and adults will say that the participant will look for the object in the original
location because they were not present when the object was moved, and the young child will
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say that they will look in the new location. The reasons for why young children answer this
way are precisely what this thesis explores. Other iterations of standard verbal false-belief
tasks have grown out of this initial study, but all aim to measure the same type of awareness
in the child. In order to succeed at the task, the child, who, as Piaget suggested, is prone to
applying their beliefs to others, must restrain this urge and instead attribute a false belief (De
Bruin, 2014).
Generally, false-belief tasks require the child to give a verbal response. This has been
criticized as one of the perceived limitations of the standard tasks (De Bruin, 2014). In
response to this potential limitation, other tasks have been developed to bypass the need for
verbal responses and thereby make it applicable to younger children and even infants.
Spontaneous-response false-belief tasks are an example of this. These tasks do not require
verbal responses but rather rely on the child’s spontaneous behavior for information. This
research, for example, measures and tries to make meaning of a child who gazes for an
extended period of time at something that violated their expectation. Meaning is also deduced
from tasks in which a child casts a seemingly anticipatory gaze at the location where another
person will mistakenly look for an object that has actually been moved.
An even more recent study suggests that false-belief tasks actually require a wide
range of processing abilities any of which could make succeeding at the task difficult for a
toddler (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). By reducing processing demands, 30- and 33month-old children were more likely to succeed at the task (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon,
2016). Young children’s inhibitory processes, that is, their ability to inhibit certain responses,
are still immature, and their ability to tune out their own privileged knowledge is limited and
takes practice. The researchers argue that the standard task questions trigger “prepotent
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responses” based on what the children themselves know (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016).
As children’s inhibitory processes are limited, they do not suppress their initial responses
when asked a standard task question about something they have some knowledge about.
Despite the fact that this would otherwise be considered an unsuccessful task result, the child
may well be able to express the knowledge of someone else if the processing demands were
reduced. In other words, it is not that the child cannot express false-belief understanding, but
rather that the child requires practice in expressing a response that conflicts with what the
child herself knows. The researchers’ solution was to allow the participants to practice
engaging with the types of questions that would be asked in the test as well as the materials
used. The researchers asked participants practice questions that resembled the ones they
would be asked on the actual task. These practice trials were not opportunities to practice
exercising false-belief understanding but rather to practice answering ‘where’ questions,
choosing between two images presented, and anticipating when questions would be asked
(i.e. when the researcher presented two images) (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016). This
procedure reduced the response-generation demands, and their results showed the effect. The
majority of the 30 to 33-month-old participants succeeded at the task. Their results support
the notion that theory of mind and false-belief understanding are both present in very young
children: “there is substantial continuity in false-belief understanding from infancy to
childhood” (Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon, 2016, p. 13361). By adjusting the administration of
the task, it became more accessible to the young child.
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2.2 Defining Theory of Mind
The term ‘theory of mind’ in an original sense refers to the basic human conception of
mental states (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). When the term was coined and research into theory
of mind became an area of intense inquiry, the methods that researchers used to try to
identify theory of mind in children changed the way that we understood its existence. With
the advent of false-belief tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), success on the task became
akin to possession of theory of mind. Hughes and Leekam refer to this as the “narrow
definition.” This definition also narrowed the research to children over the age of three or
four, hence the dearth in research of theory of mind in young toddlers who generally do not
succeed on false-belief tasks before that age (Hughes & Leekam, 2004).
It also narrowed the definition of theory of mind to include only the child’s
representational understanding of the mind. This means that it excluded their understanding
of mental states like intention and emotion (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). Meltzoff (2000)
distinguishes between two levels of mental understanding. The first he calls “mentalism,”
which is the primary understanding that there are psychological states that operate under the
surface of behavior. The second form is a representational model of the mind. As a
“representationalist” the child understands that mental states are not simply replications of
the world but rather unique interpretations of it depending on the individual. This mental
state differentiation implies a sequential development of theory of mind in which certain
stages or levels of understanding come to be determined by what precedes them. This,
Meltzoff suggests, is the basis for the theory that a singular theory of mind may not
necessarily exist. It defies the notion that theory of mind does not exist at one moment in
development and then exists in the next, as if a light were switched on.
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This also suggests that children younger than four or five might be incorporated into
the population of children possessing a theory of mind. “The experimental data that exist
seem to suggest that even two-and-a-half- to three-year-olds are mentalists, they read below
the surface behavior to understand the actions of persons” (Meltzoff, 2000, p. 152). This is
exemplified in research that displays young children’s usage of belief and desire to explain
human behavior, i.e ‘they want to use this toy!’ (Meltzoff, 2000). This has been confirmed in
three-year-olds (Bartsch and Wellman, 1989), and anyone who has spent time with two-anda-half-year-olds knows that they too have the propensity, or at least the ability, to explain
behavior in this way. This may be months or years before they might be able to succeed on a
standard false-belief task. Perhaps there are several different “theories” or degrees of a theory
that arise at different points in development as the child’s knowledge and understanding of
the world evolve (Meltzoff, 2000). This is one possible explanation for the successful results
of infants on tasks that do not require verbal explanations of mental states. Instead, these
tasks seek to measure the child’s thought processes based on behavioral or mental indicators
like gaze, joint attention, intention and sharing affective states (Stern, 1985). These are states
that do not require language and that imply intersubjective awareness, that is, some kind of
early interpersonal understanding of the mental states of others.
Young children’s abilities to recognize and respond to emotion are likewise an area of
important inquiry and seem to precede conceptions of the mind, thought processes and
therefore false-belief comprehension. Dunn (1991) suggests that it is probable that emotional
awareness is more readily available earlier on than the ability to conceptualize other people’s
cognitive processes. After all, young children, even infants, seem to be aware of other’s
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emotions especially those close to them and are perhaps even empathetic to them (see:
Gopnik, 2010).
A broader definition of theory of mind that includes insight beyond understanding of
false belief expands the threshold of theory of mind to include younger children — a
relatively novel demographic — and different degrees of awareness. In this way, a broader
definition can allow for discrepancies between what a child can understand theoretically and
what a child can actually perform in realtime. Based on her clinical work with people with
autism4, speech-language pathologist Michelle Garcia Winner has observed that what her
clients can understand about social interactions on an intellectual or theoretical level is not
necessarily reflective of how they could act in a situation requiring realtime social input
(Winner, 2014). She calls this Slow and Fast Theory of Mind. Although Winner is referring
specifically to her clients, this certainly points us towards a much broader picture of theory of
mind with a definition that encompasses a complex range of mental and social insight.

Theoretical Perspectives
The ways in which researchers conceive of the roots of theory of mind are tightly
bound to age and theories of development, and they are contingent on the definition of theory
of mind that is being considered. What some might think of as origins of theory of mind,
others might call contributors to theory of mind or the acquisition of theory of mind. This
depends on the theoretical lens that is being used, that is, the actual structure of theory of
mind that they believe in. Some lenses that are commonly applied include a modular point of

For the purposes and scope of the paper, theory of mind and autism specifically will not be
discussed, although the research on the relationships between the two is invaluable.
4
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view, a folk psychology point of view, and a simulation point of view (Origgi, 2015; Saracho,
2014b).
The modular or nativist point of view sees theory of mind as having an innate
cognitive framework (Saracho, 2014b) as if it were a module or mechanism waiting to be
activated (Origgi, 2015). This theoretical tradition suggests that theory of mind has an “innate
basis” and is not learned or acquired (Saracho, 2014b). Seen in the light of a modular
perspective, theory of mind develops independently of other social, emotional or cognitive
developments (Origgi, 2015) and therefore places little emphasis on social and environmental
factors (Hughes & Leekam, 2004).
On the other hand, some explain theory of mind as a folk or commonsense
psychology. This theory relies on a common-sense understanding of how human beings
behave to give behavior ordinary meaning (Michlmayer, 2002; Saracho, 2014b). Without
scientific background, humans access theories of mind and behavior on their own, hence the
use of the word ‘folk’ (Saracho, 2014b). Thus, seen through this lens, we are all folk
psychologists. It is also a predecessor to the modern theory-theory (Saracho, 2014b) and
explains the development of theory of mind as having a process similar to that of an evolving
scientific theory. It begins as a “naive theory” that transforms and gets restructured with time,
experience, and causal information (Origgi, 2015; Saracho, 2014b). Children are akin to
scientists, using newfound data to inform their ever-evolving theories and conceptualizations
of the world. This view takes into account the presence of other insightful abilities that
children have, such as emotion recognition, desire and deception, before their ability to
succeed on standard false-belief tasks (Origgi, 2015).
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A third lens through which theory of mind can be viewed is through the simulation
theory. Unlike the theory-theory, simulation theory suggests that mental insight depends not
on a folk psychology but on an ability to simulate being ‘in another person’s shoes.’ In other
words, rather than an implicit common-sense understanding of human behavior, one has the
ability to pretend or create comparable states as if one were another person (Saracho 2014b).
It requires one to imagine themselves in another person’s state and then extrapolate
information based on what they imagine it would feel like to be that person (Michlmayer,
2002; Origgi, 2015). This is related to, and even otherwise known as, empathy (Matravers
2017; Michlmayr, 2002).
It is likely that we employ a combination of these theories in social interaction
(Hodges and Myers, 2007). Furthermore, the operations utilized to recognize and interpret
the internal states of others may change based on environmental factors or how much we
know about the other person. This is true of both children and adults.
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2.3 Functions of Theory of Mind
Before venturing to consider the potential acquisition or development of theory of
mind, it is valuable to consider what the functions of possessing a theory of mind are at all.
Why is theory of mind an important socio-cognitive ability and in what way does it have
implications for our daily lives and in virtually all interpersonal situations? The short answer
is that it implicitly underlies human communication and shared social realities. It is “essential
for human interaction” (Saracho, 2014a, p. 6). The understanding of mental states, our own
and therefore those of others, is what allows us to distill information out of other people’s
expressive behavior.
As will be discussed below, the information we distill can be descriptive, predictive
or interpretive. For example, I can “predict” that if I filled a cereal box with rice, my friend
would be confused upon opening it. In the reverse order, we can also interpret a meaning
behind someone’s body language, gestures, actions and facial expressions. If I see someone
reaching across the table in the direction of the pepper, I can infer that this is what they are
thinking about retrieving. I could be wrong, perhaps they are actually reaching for the butter
that is right beside the pepper, but I can attribute a goal and a desire to them nonetheless.
Both abilities are thanks to this insight into the connection between mental states and
expressive behavior.
These seemingly banal examples are important to consider because they emphasize
how often we might employ a theory of mind and how, for some people, it becomes as
intuitive as breathing. These are situations that arise in the home, in the workplace, in
restaurants, in a strategic game like chess, in the airport, between family members and
between strangers, that is to say in virtually every social milieu. This interpersonal awareness
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is not simply helpful: “Such insight is crucial to one’s well-being because it helps to make
sense of what would otherwise be a very confusing social world” (Ruffman and Taumoepeau,
2014, p. 45).
The instances in which theory of mind can be and is employed are innumerable, but
they can be categorized into three main functions — comprehension, prediction and
manipulation — all of which require someone to, at the very least, conceive of another
person’s perspective (Michlmayr, 2002).

Comprehension: At its most basic level, theory of mind is a tool that allows
individuals to understand the behavior of others. It permits us to interpret daily
behaviors by using mental states to explain those behaviors. It allows someone to
understand what an individual’s goal is when she reaches into her bag and pulls a key
out upon arriving at the door of her home or why a child cries when their ice cream
falls to the ground. Simply put, theory of mind allows us to deduce why people do
the things that they do.
Although empathy is not included in Michlmayr’s original classification of the
functions of theory of mind, it seems to me that its absence from the conversation
leaves a noticeable gap. Empathy is categorized into two types of responses that can
be appropriately nestled in comprehension. Cognitive empathy refers to mental
perspective-taking and the ability to perceive another’s thoughts, including their
feelings (Hodges and Myers, 2007; Smith, 2006). Cognitive empathy affords us the
ability to recognize thoughts and emotions in the first place. In doing so, we
recognize that the internal states of others are not identical to our own. “Cognitive
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empathy is intimately linked to the development of a theory of mind, that is,
understanding that someone else’s thoughts may differ from one’s own” (Hodges and
Myers, 2007, p. 297). Moreover, the ability to recognize internal states sets the stage
for more complex interactions like interpretation, prediction, and manipulation,
which will be discussed more fully below. All are preceded by the basic recognition
of certain mental states, which cognitive empathy permits. On the other hand,
affective empathy or emotional empathy refers to the “vicarious sharing of
emotion” (Smith, 2006, p. 3). This encompasses emotional responses to others by
way of empathic concern, distress and/or care. Exactly how these two empathic
responses create the conditions for comprehension is debated, but it is clear that
empathy and theory of mind are tightly intertwined.

Prediction: Predicting behavior is a more complex function of theory of mind and
takes comprehension a bit further. The ability to anticipate behavior is part of what
allows us to formulate proper responses to it thereby allowing a certain flow in
human communication or interaction. We may not be aware of it, but we anticipate
behavior regularly. I think it is safe to say that we have all uttered something along
the lines of: ‘I was not expecting them to say that’ or ‘I was caught off guard and
didn’t know how to respond.’ However subliminally, we are constantly anticipating
behavior from people based on our experiences in interpersonal situations, and we
formulate our responses based on these expectations. When these expectations are
defied, we are, as we say, ‘caught off guard.’
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Manipulation: The combination of interpretive and predictive abilities also allow
individuals to use this mental-state intelligence to manipulate, persuade or generally
influence behavior. Theory of mind can make information like another’s desires,
beliefs, intentions and goals accessible. If, for example, I wanted my roommate to
take out the trash without explicitly saying so, I might predict that putting something
very odorous in it would compel them to do just that. This requires the understanding
that this person would not like the odor coming from the trash as well as the ability
to predict that because they do not appreciate the odor, they will want to get rid of it.
Hopefully, if I predicted correctly, they will take out the trash. In this way, theory of
mind is directly responsible for the human ability to influence and control other
people’s behavior. Despite the modern connotations of ‘manipulative’ behavior, this
function of theory of mind is neither inherently malevolent or benevolent, rather
powerful.

Taken together, these functions of theory of mind are clearly essential in social
situations that are not explicitly narrated. Take the example of the key again: one would not
necessarily say ‘I am reaching into my bag to get my house key, so that I can put it into the
key hole to unlock the door, so that I can get into my house.’ This is indeed the thread of
intentions that underlie each action in this particular situation, but they are all implicit.
Theory of mind permits unspoken yet mutual understanding.
It is important to note that theory of mind can have socially positive, negative and/or
neutral influences (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). In older children, insight into mental states can
have both positive and negative social outcomes such as enhanced connectedness and
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capacity for communication as well as forms of bullying that require a certain level of insight
(Hughes & Leekam, 2004). For example, like manipulation, theory of mind is integral to the
ability to lie. Lying, despite any qualifiers we might attach to it, requires a fairly advanced
understanding of the difference between reality and an intentional misrepresentation of it that
will likely mislead another person. The key to understanding theory of mind in the context of
lying is not how successfully a child can manipulate reality. We know from their pretend play
very early on in life that they are quite capable of doing this. What is important is that the
child has manipulated reality in such a tailored way that they expect their lie to be convincing
to another person with another mind (Frye & Moore, 1991).
Likewise, pro- and antisocial behaviors can also promote theory of mind themselves.
As the ability to conceive of another’s perspective is instrumental in both pro- and antisocial
interaction so can pro- and antisocial behaviors contribute to the development of theory of
mind: “both empathy and malicious teasing are associated with age-related increases in
toddler’s awareness of internal states” (Hughes & Leekam, 2004, p. 607).
Theory of mind is a helpful tool used to decipher the world in which we live. As
adults, we may take this understanding for granted; we may not even be aware of its presence
in our daily lives. For toddlers, it is less clear how available this awareness is. The
interpersonal behavior of children seems to suggest that, in general, young children’s social
intelligence differs from that of older children and adults. The idea that young children seem
less likely, or less able, to conceive of perspectives other than their own and thus adjust their
behavior accordingly, suggests that there is something to be developed, nurtured, facilitated
or acquired that ultimately underlies all social interaction and interpersonal understanding. It
is an exploration into the unseen, inner workings of basic human sociability.
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2.4 Roots of Theory of Mind
Given the age at which children begin to comprehend and succeed at standard falsebelief tasks, the historically accepted view was that a coherent theory of mind emerged in
four to five year old children (see: Astington, 1991; De Bruin, 2014; Saracho, 2014a).
Suggestions about the earliest signs of theory of mind in infancy point to a variety of
domains within cognitive and social development. “Some show that an understanding of
mental states is innate” (Saracho, 2014a, p. 9), that the beginning of an infant’s life marks the
beginning of its development and that some basic interpersonal understanding is implicit.
Some cross-cultural research takes an evolutionary stance and points to the potential adaptive
qualities of false-belief understanding that emerge early on in development as a form of
psychological reasoning (Barrett, et al., 2013).
Indeed, the dominant view in the literature on theory of mind is that infants have the
ability to comprehend mental states (Ruffman and Taumoepeau, 2014). However, the
assessment procedures and results used to support this belief can be interpreted differently.
Some researchers argue that early “signs” of theory of mind or perspective sharing could just
as easily be interpreted as pattern and behavior recognition (Ruffman and Taumoepeau,
2014). Conversely, developmental psychologists who are convinced of this ability in infants
claim that non-verbal activities like imitation and sharing affect are examples of the infant
capacity to understand mental states (Gopnik, 2010).

Imitation
Imitation in infancy is often regarded as grounding evidence for mental awareness.
Some go so far as to suggest that it is the basis of infant empathic predispositions: “…for
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babies imitation is both a symptom of innate empathy and a tool to extend and elaborate that
empathy” (Gopnik, 2010, p. 206). Although imitation is also criticized as rote mimicry, some
research provides contrasting evidence that imitation and observational learning may
contribute in some way to a child’s developing understanding of “shared meaning” (Hay et
al., 1991). A study by Hay, Stimson & Castle suggests that behavioral imitation is mutually
meaningful for the child and the person (adult) that he is imitating. Not only is it mutually
meaningful, but imitation is also inseparable from the intentions and desires of both the child
and the adult (Hay et al., 1991). Moreover, this awareness of shared meaning is promoted by
opportunities to imitate and learn observationally. Although their study could not define
direct consequences on the construction of theory of mind specifically, it illuminates a
“meeting of minds in the conative realm between thought, feeling and action” (Hay et al.,
1991, p. 136).

Intentionality
Another domain that has been suggested as evidence for infant theory of mind that
may precede false-belief comprehension is intentionality (Meltzoff, 2000). It is clear that
infants share in emotional states and are able to recognize behavioral patterns fairly early on
in life (Dunn, 1991), but the connection between these abilities and a more complex insight
into mental states is less clear. Recognizing behavior as intentional is regarded as an
important milestone in laying the groundwork for a child’s social development (Hughes &
Leekam, 2004). Thus intention in infancy is one area of development that has been strongly
linked with the development of theory of mind (Frye, 1991; Meltzoff, 2000). Indeed some
define theory of mind as the ability to understand others as “intentional agents” (Origgi,
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2015). Frye’s argument for this relationship stems from the notion that recognizing intention
seems to demand more insight than simply recognizing behavioral patterns and thus is a
prerequisite for theory of mind (Frye, 1991). He suggests that this occurs around the time that
a child is eight months old, when social and cognitive abilities begin to become
differentiated. This crucial differentiation refers to the child’s budding ability to distinguish
people from objects and the different behaviors that each of them evoke - biological or
mechanical. Piaget recognized similar behavior in his work on children’s conceptions of the
spatial and social realms.
As adults, we know that one must act differently toward a person versus an object,
but research and observation show that this is not immediately understood. Frye found that
while ten-month-old babies made this behavioral distinction, three-month-old babies did not.
Piaget made a similar observation of changes in children’s experiences of the world during
the sensorimotor period (Doyle, 1987). The children that he observed to be making this
differentiation were roughly the same age as the children that Frye observed. Piaget called
this fundamental shift in experience the Copernican Revolution, during which children’s
knowledge about the social and physical worlds and their relationships to those realms
evolves (Doyle, 1987). The direct implications for children’s abilities to understand other
perspectives derive from this differentiation of the spatial and social worlds itself because
taking another’s perspective requires social knowledge that cannot be explained by the laws
of the physical world. Frye suggests that perhaps it is intention that permits this eventual
qualitative differentiation in behavior (Frye, 1991) because intention implies a mental
existence that informs future behavior. What is less clear is how much an infant’s
understanding of their own intentions towards objects and people determines their
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understanding of these same tendencies in others and, importantly, not in objects (Frye,
1991). Nevertheless, their awareness of their own intentions at least offers a chance to
recognize them in others (Frye, 1991). It is a watershed moment when the child is able to
conceive of others as ‘selves’ (Bretherton, 1991).
Meltzoff (2000) would agree that intention is a likely spring from which theory of
mind flows. His findings show that at eighteen months this essential differentiation between
person and object seems to exist (Meltzoff, 2000). This is in line with both Piaget and Frye’s
prior findings. Children seem to be able to infer intention from the actions of a human being
specifically but do not always attribute the same intention to an inanimate device even when
it mimicked the action of a human being (Meltzoff, 2000). Perhaps there are “limits of the
types of entities that are interpreted within this framework” (Meltzoff, 2000, p. 165). In other
words, it seems that at eighteen months babies reserve attributions of intention exclusively
for people. This could be the foundation for a “theory of mind module” (Meltzoff, 2000) — a
tendency to engage with human beings within a different framework than that within which
we engage with objects.
If evidence of theory of mind springs from behaviors in infancy, then what are the
subsequent agents of its development? According to research, these agents are parts of the
social domains of a child’s life. In these domains, the child is exposed to the reality of other
minds and, later, has the opportunity to discuss them. The following section discusses some
of these potential agents of development.
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2.5 A Developing Theory of Mind
However the roots of theory of mind are conceptualized, it is clear that mental insight
evolves over time and with experience. Research has shown that many, if not most, of the
significant experiences that cultivate theory of mind seem to be, perhaps not surprisingly,
very social in nature. Again, the roles that different social elements play in this development
are reported differently in the literature. There are theories that place varying weight on the
roles of attachment, social interaction within family systems, language and play.

Attachment
Generations of research in attachment theory emphasize the importance of a
caregiver 5-child relationship and secure attachment in virtually all areas of a child’s
development. Socio-cognitive development is no exception. The links between theory of
mind and caregiver sensitivity and emotional availability have been a telling area of recent
inquiry (Licata et al., 2016). The direct consequences of the caregiver-child relationship on
theory of mind are quite clear. These researchers argue that caretaker sensitivity is
instrumental in bolstering the child’s ability to recognize and interpret mental and emotional
states (Licata et al., 2016). Moreover, research has reported a direct lineage from maternal
sensitivity, warmth and secure attachment to the child’s theory of mind later in life (Licata et
al., 2016).
Social-emotional and socio-cognitive development are enhanced by a strongly
sensitive and emotionally available caretaker (Licata et al., 2016; Hughes & Leekam, 2004).
Indeed, the role of ‘caregiver’ has historically been synonymous with the mother, but the word
caregiver will be used in this discussion to represent primary caretakers that certainly include but are
not limited to the mother.
5
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The social, emotional and cognitive abilities later in life that are linked to earlier attachment
and caregiver sensitivity include emotion recognition, false-belief comprehension,
understanding goals and intentions, and empathy (Licata et al., 2016). Therefore, although
the amount of research in this specific domain is not significant, the importance of the
attachment relationship to the development of theory of mind is strongly emphasized by
some (see: Hughes & Leekam, 2004). The evidence for these assumptions derives from the
reported outcomes of an emotionally consistent and engaged caretaker. Licata et al. (2016)
argue that the emotional availability of the caretaker affords the child three significant things:
(1) Acknowledgment by way of the mother’s reflection of the child’s own mental states; (2)
Consistency between the mother’s affect and the actual emotions that underlie it, thus
allowing the child to correctly connect behavior with mental states; (3) Freedom to revel in
the security of a stable and consistent caretaker and thereby have the emotional capacity to
focus on others.
These findings, however, are punctuated by the child’s own characteristics. The
relationship between a child’s temperament and their own attachment to their caregiver is
also significant. That is to say that taking temperament into account as well as its
implications on the quality of their early attachment could explain individual differences in
the age at which children understand false belief (Licata et al., 2016). While it has been
reported that a mother’s sensitive and warm interactions towards her baby have influence on
the later development of theory of mind, what needs more research is the extent to which the
mutuality of their relationship affects the developing insight. This mutuality is defined by a
connection consisting of both the mother’s and the baby’s demeanor and interactions. Given
how enmeshed the emotional sensitivity of the mother usually is in the child’s own emotional
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feedback, this group of researchers expected and reported a correlative relationship between
the emotional availability of the child and their own development of theory of mind. The
emotional connection was beneficial to the child’s mental-state understanding (Licata et al.,
2016). The findings suggest that although the caregiver's warmth and sensitivity is valuable
and necessary, the better indicator in later developments in theory of mind is the dyadic
connection between caregiver and child. Moreover, early interaction proved to be more
significant than later interaction in the development of social cognition, serving as the
bedrock of theory of mind.

Family Systems
Theory of mind is ultimately a social matter. It follows, then, that its development
might be most significantly fostered in social modes. Observations of children in families
make evident how in tune young children are to others, particularly within their close family
systems (Dunn, 1991; Licata et al., 2016; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994). Dunn and
others shed light on an inconsistency in the theory that young children are limited in their
understanding of others given their overwhelming ability to function within the social
ecology of a family (Dunn, 1991). Likewise, the family system itself plays an important role
in the development of mental insight (Hughes & Leekam, 2004; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam,
1994). A large family and particularly one with siblings has been positively correlated with
false-belief understanding in three to four year olds (Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994).
Together, these statements suggest that children have more interpersonal insight at a younger
age and that the social environment plays a decisive role in the development of this insight. It
is a two-way street.
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Given Dunn’s observations, it is clear that two-year-olds recognize and respond to the
emotional states of family members. The second and third years of life are particularly
generative in terms of acquiring insight into feeling states and intentions (Dunn, 1991). Not
only do they recognize emotion states, namely distress, but they also seem to be curious
about the causes of those emotions (Dunn, 1991). Dunn also suggests considering the role of
familiarity of person and context in a child’s ability to understand a person’s mental state.
Perhaps there are different degrees of awareness for intimate family members versus
hypothetical others that usually dominate research of false-belief comprehension. How much
do children, or even adults, need to know about a person before they can truly attribute
mental states to them? Among other variables, Dunn proposes that the emotional context of
the family and the events that occur within them, such as disputes and family discourse about
others, might contribute to developing theories of mind.
Social systems like the nuclear family both nurture theory of mind and provide
opportunities for children to employ it. The familial context is particularly important to
consider given the emotional investment of the child in it. Studies show just how invested
children are in matters, namely disputes, that are particularly relevant to them (Dunn, 1991).
This research highlights the relationship between emotionally-charged exchanges and social
intelligence. Results showed that situations of arousal did not seem to be incompatible with
children’s learning. On the contrary, these emotions seemed to contribute somehow as
children appeared to exhibit their most “mature” social behavior in disputes over their own
rights and interests (Dunn, 1991). Indeed, in disagreement social intelligence becomes an
increasingly important skill.
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[T]here may well be special significance in the emotion-laden exchanges in the
family — exchanges in which it is clearly of great importance for the child to learn
how others will behave and think. (Dunn, 1991, p. 111)
Disputes with others inherently involve the diverging interests of at least two people, creating
potential opportunities for the child to be exposed to differing points of view. Moreover, the
fact that these situations are emotionally salient to the child might mean that they will be
more likely to apply their intelligence (Dunn, 1991). Generally, for young children these
kinds of interactions occur most often in the home and between intimate family members.
Cooperative situations between older and younger siblings are also formative
moments and are positively correlated with false belief understanding in younger siblings
(Dunn, 1991). Thus, these moments of conflict and cooperation prove to be crucial in the
child’s developing understanding of other people. Not only are they forced to grapple with
the opinions of others as distinct from or even as similar to their own, but also this usually
entails some explicit discourse about opinion, intention, desire and belief. Thus, family
discourse about the intentions of others is also potentially significant to a developing theory
of mind (Dunn, 1991). Dunn suggests that these kinds of conversations that distinguish the
mental states of one person from another support the child’s own developing theory of mind
longitudinally.
Likewise, Dunn’s observations of jokes and shared humorous experiences as well as
moments of teasing suggest a sensitivity on the part of the young child to others’ mental
states. Humorous exchanges suggest that a child must have some idea of what the other
person will find funny, and ‘successful’ sibling teasing requires the young child to predict
what would rile their sibling up.
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Although theory of mind is often regarded as congruent with age and maturation, a
theory that emphasizes the child’s environment and social systems adjusts the emphasis.
Instead, emphasis is placed on social and environmental factors, like family size and cultural
and familial background, as responsible for the rate at which theory of mind develops and
evolves. This approach also highlights the child’s own effects on their environment and the
significance of the interactive role a child plays in their own development (Hughes &
Leekam, 2004).

Language
Like the exchanges between a child and their environment, the relationship between a
child and their budding linguistic capabilities is seen as a significantly formative one. Among
other social and cognitive variables that have been explored, language emerges as having one
of the most significant relationships to theory of mind and false-belief comprehension. For
children, language bears weight on the complexity of their mental insight (Saracho, 2014a;
Milligan et al., 2007). Not that insight into mental states exists only in the company of
acquired language, but rather language affords perspective sharing the potential to reach
more complex levels (Milligan et al., 2007). With the acquisition of language comes a more
complex way of categorizing and describing phenomena, namely mental ones. As individuals
mature, insight into our own and therefore others’ emotional states, desires, opinions and
beliefs will be attached to and expressed with words (Saracho, 2014a). Importantly, these
words may or may not be verbalized but they are words nonetheless (Saracho, 2014a). They
are common symbols that contribute to mutual understanding and to the ability to
communicate effectively with other people. Indeed the general consensus is that language
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and theory of mind are interactive. However while both have a hand in the other’s
development, language seems to have a stronger influence over the development of theory of
mind than the reverse (Milligan et al., 2007).
With that said, these findings can be interpreted quite differently. Some argue that
language is correlated with theory of mind because it affords the child certain receptive and
expressive capabilities that allow them to understand the words that they hear and to describe
what they are thinking. Consequently, this has been one of the major arguments for language
as a barrier to the successful distillation of information from false-belief tasks with young
children (Meltzoff, 2000). This, however, implies that false-belief tasks are effectively verbal
tasks and may be a misleading way to evaluate theory of mind (Milligan et al., 2007). As the
acquisition of language often occurs steadily alongside age, it has been used to indicate the
point at which a child will be successful on a false-belief task and thus possess a coherent
theory of mind. Other studies propose that age might not necessarily be a determining factor
given some inconsistencies in age and success on the task. In reality, children have been
known to succeed at false-belief tasks at three, or in the case of this thesis 2 years 11 months,
or for the first time at five (Milligan et al., 2007).
On the other hand, some believe that the properties of linguistics are not significant
and that language is indicative of certain conceptual developments in consciousness. In their
meta-analysis of 104 studies evaluating the correlation between language and false-belief
understanding, Milligan et al. (2007) propose that an understanding of false belief is
undeniably connected to language but is not consistently dependent on the same linguistic
abilities. This is evidenced by inconsistent results from studies emphasizing the relationships
between specific linguistic areas, like vocabulary, semantics or syntax, and false-belief
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comprehension (Milligan et al., 2007). As the findings were varied and contradictory across
studies, it is unclear how requisite mastery of certain linguistic systems actually are for the
development of theory of mind or false-belief comprehension.
What seems to be a more relevant explanation for the relationship between language
and theory of mind is how linguistic capabilities are indicative of conceptual capabilities. As
language develops so does familiarity with “mental terms” like “think,” “believe” and
“remember.” As these terms are imbued with meaning, it permits a growing conceptual
understanding of the representational lives of human beings and the ability to socially
interact based on this understanding (Milligan et al., 2007). This goes beyond pure linguistic
ability because the child must be able to use terms that describe mental positions
meaningfully (Milligan et al., 2007). Thus, this is indicative of a conceptual and linguistic
shift that takes place sometime in the preschool-age years (Milligan, et al., 2007). It is not
enough for the child to be able to say the word “think” — a feat of vocabulary — for they
must also know that when they use this word, they are recognizing and evoking unseen
mental processes that govern what people say and do.

Play
Play is another domain in which theory of mind skills and false-belief comprehension
develop. There is plenty of convincing research and theory that proves the multifaceted value
of play in the lives of children. These studies suggest that play promotes a variety of
developmental domains such as language development, literacy, social skills, meaning
making, social-emotional development, emotion-regulation, impulse control, motor skills,
creativity, other cognitive functions and learning in general. Theory of mind and false-belief
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comprehension are certainly part of this and theorists from different theoretical backgrounds
consider pretense to be a precondition for false belief.
Pretend play affords children direct experiences with pretense and role play that seem
to invoke the same skills used in understanding mental states (Lillard, 1993). Ultimately,
Lillard’s study concluded that although children’s behavior in play might seem to indicate
that they are aware of the mental basis of pretend realities, there was not enough evidence to
support it. It is possible that in pretend play, children can understand how to play “as if” they
were someone or something else without recognizing the fact that those alternate existences
are based in mental realities (Lillard, 1993). Nevertheless, “as if” play is a noteworthy part of
the process towards false-belief understanding in particular. “Belief and pretense are
conceptually very closely related because both lead to acting-as-if” (Perner, Ruffman &
Leekam, 1994, p. 1236). Veena Das also alludes to this significance and intersection of
conceptual skills:
The significance of play lies in the fact that it enables the child to take the voice of
the other. It is when the child learns to assume the viewpoint of other people through
role playing. (Das, 1989, p. 280)
Pretend play in particular is a prime example of how a child must be able to
accommodate multiple realities simultaneously — both the real and the pretend (Vygotsky,
1978). Theory of mind requires a similar flexibility in thinking (Sussman, 2012). This seems
especially applicable to false-belief, as it also requires the accommodation of multiple
realities, that is, the diverging realities of the self and the other.
Perhaps the most relevant areas of development that play promotes are socially
oriented. Like interactions with siblings and other family members, pretend play with other
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children provides opportunities for them to agree and/or disagree and thereby reconcile the
existence of different perspectives. Play encourages children to consider other points of
views and to negotiate them (Sussman, 2012). Play with other children functions much like
interactions within the familial context because it naturally requires children to interact with
people that have distinct mental lives governing their behaviors, desires, and emotions. Like
play with siblings, play with other children is an example of a cooperative activity and
perhaps one of the most intensive social situations that toddlers are exposed to (Perner,
Ruffman & Leekam, 1994).
Play, like attachment, family systems and language, is important to consider because
it is an example of a domain in which theory of mind is both employed and cultivated. It is a
genuine example of the child’s active and participatory role in a creative context that is
exceedingly specific and important to children. Indeed, “pretend play is perhaps our best
candidate for a cooperative activity which furthers the eventual understanding of false belief”
(Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994, p. 1236)
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3. False Belief Task and Naturalistic Observations
3.1 Methods
In light of the preceding sections, the following chapter presents an authentic falsebelief task. It is in part a nod to research that questions the potentially decisive role of
language in tasks like these, as well as to the significance of this watershed moment in the
development of theory of mind. Additionally, naturalistic observations of these children in
the same setting offer different interpretations of their awareness and perspective-taking
abilities despite or perhaps in complement to their task results. Thus, in order to encompass
more comprehensibly the range of engagement with mental states in the classroom, the
following study is comprised of these two distinct parts. Together, they ultimately create a
more holistic image of theory of mind and false-belief comprehension in this group of twoand-a-half-year-olds.

Table 1: Children’s Ages - Afternoon Two’s Class
Child

Age (In Years:Months at time of task)

Child 1

2:6

Child 2

2:9

Child 3

2:11

Child 4

2:6

Child 5

2:7

Child 6

2:11

Child 7

3:0
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False-Belief Task
The task that I carried out was an adaptation of a standard false-belief task. While this
task is generally reserved for older children, I simplified the language and adapted the
procedures in an attempt to make it more relevant to the two-and-a-half-year-old child. A
standard false belief task requires a child to consider the perspective of a late-arriving
bystander. This bystander enters a situation in which the child has privileged knowledge
about something that will ultimately defy the bystander’s expectation. In this case, I used a
bandaid box filled with rocks. Before seeing the alternative contents (i.e. rocks), one would
likely assume that the band-aid box was filled with bandaids, thus creating a false belief or
defied expectation.
The group of participants was originally comprised of all eight children in the
afternoon Two’s program6 at the Early Childhood Center (see Table 1 for ages). Although at
the beginning of this study there were eight participants, for a variety of reasons, one child
was no longer able to participate in the task and therefore the final number of participants is
seven. All seven children participated voluntarily, and no one was forced to participate.
The first step of the task was to obtain oral consent. Upon obtaining oral consent from
each child, the first questions I posed confirmed that the child indeed knew what bandaids

Given the uniqueness of this particular program, a brief description of it will be contextually
beneficial to the reader who is not familiar with it. The purpose of this particular Two’s Program is to
invite children and their parents to experience school together for the first time and to facilitate
healthy parent-child separation at a pivotal moment in the child’s development. The geographical
space is divided into the “classroom” and the “parent room.” At the beginning of the year, both
parent and child are in the classroom together until they are ready for the parent to move into the
“parent room” down the hall. The children are able to move freely between rooms and interact with
their parents on their own terms whenever they need or desire to. Naturally, the needs of the children
fluctuate daily and generally over the course of the year, and there is great variation in how much
children flow between the rooms. Some children do not leave the classroom for the duration of class
and others flow between the rooms consistently.
6
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and the bandaid box were. Then I asked them what they thought was inside of the box. I had
loose bandaids to show the child and to ignite a bit of conversation about them. After the
child’s statement about what they believed to be inside the box, I opened the box to reveal
that it was, surprisingly, filled with rocks instead of bandaids. Then, I asked the child what
was actually inside the box to confirm their knowledge of both rocks and the actual contents
of the bandaid box. Finally, I closed the box and asked the child what I will call the “pivotal
question,” that is, what they thought one of their late-arriving classmates would think was in
the box given the fact that they had not seen the whole demonstration (e.g. Now, there’s Sally
over there; what is Sally going to think is in the box?). I also presented an image of the latearriving classmate while asking the pivotal question in order to provide more visual context
for the participant. The choice to invoke a classmate versus a hypothetical other was
intentional given Dunn’s suggestion that familiarity might play a part in the ability to
attribute mental states. Parents were considered to fulfill this role but were ultimately not
utilized out of concern that the emotional tie to the parent, or perception of parent as allknowing, would somehow muddy the responses.
In an attempt to account for the variation in linguistic ability, I offered two images for
the child to point to in response to the pivotal question — one of a box of bandaids filled with
bandaids and the other of a box of bandaids filled with rocks. The idea was for the child to
have the option to either point to an image or to express their thoughts verbally. After hearing
or seeing their prediction of the late-arriving bystander’s perspective, I asked the child why
they thought what they did in order to get a better sense of the mental operations that led
them to their answer.
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Each interaction lasted a few minutes and children were free to refuse to respond or
ignore me if they wished to. Children’s real names were not used, nor was the information
recorded indicative of any individual children by name. Responses were recorded directly
after each individual task and after the child had returned to another classroom activity.

Naturalistic Observations
The purpose of including naturalistic observations in addition to a false-belief task is
multifold. Although I attempted to adapt the task to be more accessible to a child under the
age of three, I did not assume that it would be foolproof and thus I included descriptions of
quotidian interactions that occurred in the classroom.
My observations focused on any episode of the children’s interpersonal interactions,
attributions of mental and physical states to other people or fictional characters (i.e. dolls and
characters in books), and instances that might signify a conception of false belief. These
observations included attributions of desires, beliefs and/or opinions that either did or did not
diverge from the child’s own, moments of deception, and shared humor. I also observed
numerous instances of inquiry into children’s intentions (e.g. ‘Why is she doing that?’) and
moments of deception (e.g. ‘I am going to hide this here so that he won’t find it!’), as well as
sympathetic tendencies, empathetic behavior and intersubjective understanding between
peers. These latter behaviors were exemplified by children’s reactions to and awareness of
other children’s emotions (i.e. sadness, pain and frustration). Most of these instances
occurred in moments of emotional distress, harking back to Dunn’s suggestion that children
of this age become increasingly sensitive to these kinds of emotions. In these situations, I
also made note of the mental or behavioral terms that the children used to describe each
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other, for example ‘the child is crying’ versus ‘the child is sad.’ The difference in qualifiers
that children choose shows just how varied the attributions are that young children are
making to other people.
Observations took place twice a week for two hours each in the same afternoon Two’s
class. The eight children ranged between the ages of 24-36 months over the course of the
academic year (September 2017 — May 2018). Two initially significant variables — age and
setting — made this group especially fascinating given the novelty of the social situation and
the children’s varying linguistic levels. Most of these children were experiencing school and
socializing in a group of numerous children for the first time, and language, an important tool
in relaying experiences, beliefs and desires to others, was vastly diverse among the eight
children.
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3.2 Results and Discussion
False-Belief Task
Table 2: Children’s Responses to the Pivotal Question
Child

Response to the Pivotal Question

Child 1

n/a

Child 2

Rocks

Child 3

Rocks

Child 4

n/a

Child 5

Rocks

Child 6

Bandaids

Child 7

Rocks

More than half of the children in the study answered incorrectly (rocks), one child
answered correctly (bandaids), and two of the children were unable to complete the task in
its entirety for varying reasons. Although the purpose of conducting this study in the
classroom and choosing classmates to be the late-arriving bystanders was to provide some
familiar framework, this did not seem to me to make the children more likely to correctly
attribute false belief. Moreover, I found the images to be a distraction rather than a helpful
aid. In light of the research by Setoh, Scott & Baillargeon (2016) the images might have been
better incorporated into the task by allowing the children to practice using them before the
actual task. Although the children liked looking at them, it seems that it was necessary to
introduce how I intended for them to be used. The majority of the children had enough
language to verbally express their thoughts, thus interaction with the images usually
dissolved into labeling of the objects in them.
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The children’s results could exemplify several things depending on the theoretical
lens applied. The results could be typical of children whose theory of mind has not yet
reached the level of false-belief comprehension or whose linguistic abilities created
limitations surrounding the language and/or conceptual understanding of the task. From a
processing-demands perspective, the task may not have reduced the demands of the task
enough and thus the child’s inhibitory limitations interfered with their ability to answer
correctly. As we have gathered from the literature, there is great variability in theoretical
explanations as well as in general in children’s lives. Therefore, the same explanation may
not be applicable to all six children that did not succeed on the task. For some children
language did indeed seem to be a convincing barrier, for others it was attention. For others
still the barrier seemed to be conceptual as was the nature of the context in which false-belief
comprehension was being invoked. In other words, perhaps access to false-belief
understanding fluctuates depending on the context, which in this case was either a contrived
task or a spontaneous, observed play scenario.
For the purpose of discussion, I have chosen to focus on four of the seven children.
The choice to include these four was based on how their task results exemplify certain
phenomena that have been previously discussed or how the circumstances of their task defied
my own expectations.

Child 1, 2:6
This child could not participate for the full length of the task due to external
distractions, such as other activities and toys. I attempted the task twice with this child, and
both times was only able to get through the first part of it, that is, before asking the pivotal
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question. This child also has the least amount of language of all the students. His language
consists mostly of one- or two-word statements. During the first attempt, the child simply
walked away after seeing what was inside the box. When he came back, I proceeded to ask
him the question using the visual aids. He pointed immediately to the image of the box of
bandaids filled with bandaids and then immediately afterwards to the image of the box filled
with rocks and said “rocks.” My interpretation of this is that this child pointed to the box
filled with bandaids out of recognition and then pointed at the rocks for the same reason but
was simply connecting the word ‘rocks’ to the image of rocks.
During the second trial, the child wanted to see what was inside the box immediately,
and when I began to ask the pivotal question, the child pointed at the closed box and said
“bandaids” then got distracted by a basket of cars nearby and walked away. My interpretation
of both of our interactions together is that this child was likely naming recognizable objects
and that his attention was divided. This might have been expected, however, in a classroom
filled with other tantalizing things that are certainly competition for attention.

Child 4, 2:6
This child agreed to answer some questions about the bandaid box, but as soon as I
started to ask about them, the child became very anxious and kept repeating: “no boo boos; I
don’t have any booboos.” I tried to clarify to him that I was aware that he did not have any
injuries and that the bandaids were just for fun, but he could not let go of the expectations
linked to the sight of bandaids. This was not a barrier that I anticipated running into, but is
helpful to note for future research. It is an example of a child’s potential inability to separate
an object from a very specific meaning or experience and the emotionally-charged fog that
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can cloud one’s ability to attend to a task. It is not surprising that this was a reaction to
bandaids, as they are usually employed when the child is injured and is potentially distressed.
Perhaps I was not clear enough about the fact that I was not assuming the child had an injury,
but it seemed that as soon as he saw the bandaids, his mind was set on rejecting them. In the
future, I would offer another set of materials as an option for a child who is uncomfortable
engaging with bandaids.

Child 5, 2:7
Child 5 represents the majority of children that answered “rocks.” This child
thoroughly enjoyed the task and was very interested in playing with the bandaids, namely
opening them and taking them out of the encasing. This child enthusiastically answered by
saying “rocks” after being posed the pivotal question. When I asked this child why she
thought this, she responded “because it’s silly!”
This response can be interpreted several different ways. The word ‘silly’ is the same
one that I used when describing the “silliness” of the bandaid box filled with rocks. From a
linguistic point of view, the child could have simply misunderstood the language and used
my qualification about the box full of rocks to explain the other classmate’s hypothetical
reasoning. Other, cognitive interpretations of this are possible. If in fact the child does not yet
have a theory of mind that would allow her to conceive of another’s perspective, then it could
be argued that this child still attributes her own view of the world to others. Piaget would
have described these results in terms of egocentrism. The children who answered rocks said
so because at this time in their lives children attribute their experience of the world to
everyone else. The children’s follow up responses might also support this notion, such as the
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responses of Children 3 and 4. Their reasonings were, “because he knows there are rocks in
there” and “because he likes them” respectively. Both of these responses could be seen as
deriving from the children’s own knowledge and feelings about the rocks in the box.

Child 6, 2:11
After being posed the pivotal question about the knowledge of the late-arriving
bystander, this child answered confidently and enthusiastically, “band-aids!” Although it was
not part of my task, she insisted that we show the late-arriving classmate the contents of the
box to witness the reaction. When we did, the classmate reacted with excitement and Child 6
rejoiced in the fact that the bystander’s expectation had been defied. This is impressive given
the literature that suggests that this task is only successful with children over a certain age. It
was especially interesting given the fact that at the end of the task she insisted on following
through with the hypothetical situation to experience the classmate’s reaction. The other
children in the study returned to play when the task had been completed.
Moreover, this child’s unique capacity for play that involves pretense and role-taking
further validates her result with evidence of her perspective-taking abilities outside the
domain of this task. As we have seen, there are several reasons why role-taking in play is a
fascinating phenomenon. The reason that it is so relevant to theory of mind and to this child
is that it clearly exemplifies her ability and propensity to conceive of, and even to actively
embody, another person’s perspective.
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Child 7, 3:0
This child’s response to the pivotal question was “rocks,” although I hypothesized
that this child would answer correctly given his age and linguistic capability. When I asked
him why he thought this, his responses seemed to evade the heart of my question: “I’m going
to take [the rocks] out to show [her]. I’m going to take them out and line them up so that
[she] and me can count them together.” Then, he began to take the rocks out of the box one
by one and line them up on the floor in a long column. Any further inquiry from me was
effectively ignored.
Children 6 and 7 are the two most advanced speakers in the class. While I do not
know much about their home lives firsthand, I know that they are both only children and
spend much of their time out of school with their mothers. I can assume from their
interactions with their parents at school that the children are viewed as partners in
conversation and in play with at least their mothers. Although I hypothesized that both would
succeed on the false-belief task based on their abilities in other areas, only Child 6 did. Child
6 is a few days younger, does not usually leave the room to play with her mother during class
and occasionally engages with other children. She usually plays alone, but is not ruffled by
the unsolicited curiosity of other two-year-olds. On the other hand, Child 7 is consistently
removed from the group and makes clear that he wishes to be removed by choosing secluded
places to play. He is possessive of toys and often wishes to leave the room to play with his
mother — his preferred playmate. Given Child 6 and 7’s similarly advanced language skills,
linguistic ability cannot account for their differing task results. Although I might have agreed
with the theory that standard false-belief tasks might actually be more evaluative of linguistic
abilities than cognitive ones, after conducting research of my own and looking at the results
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from two children of almost the same age with similar linguistic capabilities, I am not so
sure. Language is certainly part of it, but exactly how is less clear, and these two task results
make this evident.

Naturalistic Observations
Observation A
Participants: Child 2 (2:5), Teacher
Child 2, who has taken to playing with baby dolls, pulls one out of the crib.
Child 2: “Is the baby hungry?” He brings the baby to the teacher and asks her if the
baby is hungry.
Teacher: “You want to know if the baby is hungry?”
Child 2: “Yes.”
He moves away and begins feeding the baby. He lines up several babies on the table
and hovers over one of the babies with a toy bottle, feeding it.
Child 2: “Their tummies rumble.” He repeats this to himself several times.

In this observation, Child 2 attributes a mental state — hunger — to a physical
indicator — rumbling tummies. What we do not know, however, is what operation the child
is employing to make this claim. Is it a function of theory of mind? While the answer is
decidedly ambiguous without more comprehensive insight into this child’s thought processes,
the child is making behavioral inferences.
As Piaget originally suggested, there can be a way of inferencing that is egocentric.
The narrative connected to this is something along the lines of ‘How would I feel if I myself
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were in this situation?’ This is a generally familiar narrative even for adults. In this case, selfinsight helps inform the insight that we have into the mind and behavior of another person.
This is not to be confused with a similar but different narrative: ‘How would I feel if I were
that person,’ which is what a simulation theory suggests. In this case, instead of using selfknowledge to gather information about others, knowledge about the other is directly
employed. In light of this, it is possible that this child is using his own knowledge from past
experiences with hunger. Making a claim about the baby with the rumbling tummy would be
based on how he himself would feel if his own tummy were rumbling. Apparently, he would
feel hungry.
This same operational pattern is evident in his attribution of feeling states to
characters in books that we read. He consistently comments on a certain smiling butterfly at
the end of Bornstein’s Little Gorilla (2014): “The butterfly is smiling because everyone is
singing “Happy Birthday”!” Then the child points to the smirking gorilla beside the butterfly:
“He’s happy too.” Child 2 attributes happiness to the butterfly and the gorilla because they
are smiling and because they are being serenaded by their friends on their birthday. We can
infer from his claims that he believes that people feel happy when others sing “Happy
Birthday” to them and that smiling indicates happiness.
Whether this information derives from his own personal experience or whether he is
using the behavior of smiling as an indication that the animals are enjoying themselves is,
again, ambiguous. Yet, despite the operation used to make inferences about the ‘internal state’
of the baby doll or the butterfly, he is making a connection between an observable behavior
and attributing it to an unseen feeling state. This could be reason enough to believe that
though he many not yet understand false belief, he understands that mental states underlie
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expressive phenomena like rumbling tummies and smiling. As we have seen, this ability to
assign emotion states to expressions is a prerequisite for more complex inferencing
capabilities. Another observation with the same child further elucidates this.

Observation B
Participants: Child 2 (2:5)
Child 2 brings a book to the teacher to read called The Feelings Book 7. The cover is
compartmentalized into four sections each featuring a face displaying a different emotion
(see image 1.1. below). We sit down to read the book and he points to each of the faces
starting with the face in the square on the bottom right: “This is a mad face; this is a sad face;
this is a loud face; this is a happy face.”
Image 18

Here, the child clearly recognizes and points out affective states on the book cover —
a fledgling instance of cognitive empathy. He uses this ability to attribute feeling states to

7

Parr, T. (2000). The Feelings Book. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

8

Ibid.
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facial expressions, an important prerequisite for a more complex awareness of differentiated
internal states later on. Like Dunn suggests, the ability to recognize emotional states may
precede the ability to recognize other mental states. It is an important operational milestone.
The ability to make a claim about another’s feelings based on their expressions is inherently
part of the trajectory because of how intertwined theory of mind and cognitive empathy are
(Hodges and Myers, 2007).
Recognizing another’s diverging feeling state immediately differentiates the child
from the other who is feeling differently. Affect and facial expressions are important facets of
social knowledge when we are able to recognize them and ultimately make inferences from
them. They are powerful referencing agents in social situations and can and will inform how
we intend to interact with another person. This kind of recognition can be applied to virtually
all areas of interpersonal exchange. It requires a child to make the connection between
external behavior and internal states and adds to the child’s growing database of social
information. More social information allows for more complex inferences. It is important to
consider how his behavior is a relevant part of the process and even more so a necessary
piece of the theory of mind puzzle. This becomes more blatantly clear if we consider a child
who is not able to recognize emotions and facial expressions in a book or elsewhere in the
environment.

Observation C
Participants: Child 7 (3:0), Teacher
Child 7 is playing on the reading rug with a collection of toy cars and a wooden
garage. I am sitting on the rug near him, and he turns to me.

51
Child 7: “I need someone to play with me.”
Teacher: “Do you want to ask if another child would like to play with you?”
Child 7: “It needs to be a teacher.”
Teacher: “Would you like me to play with you?”
Child 7: “Yes!”

Based on previous experience with this child, it was immediately clear to me that
when he said he needed someone to play with, he was implying that he wanted me to play
with him. This is an observation of the manipulative function of theory of mind. We had been
playing together earlier that day, and in suggesting that he needed a play partner that was
specifically a teacher, he seemed to have a certain goal in mind that he was not explicitly
stating. He constructed a dialogue that made offering myself to be the play partner a very
logical response. For whatever reason, he wanted me to offer to play as opposed to asking me
explicitly and thus successfully fabricated a situation in which he could essentially make me
do that. This required him to presume a certain train of thought on my part. However
consciously or subconsciously the process was for him, he seems to have employed a theory
of mind process to do this. I believe that he anticipated that I would offer to play in response
to his first declaration of need. When I did not, instead of asking me outright, he added
another stipulation that narrowed my response options and made offering myself the most
convenient and compatible with his request. The other options would have been to involve
another teacher or to decline his request altogether, neither of which were likely to happen.
Other naturalistic observations of this child’s behavior in the classroom support my
belief that this process was driven by theory of mind. For example, he has a tendency to hide
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toys from other children and when doing so, says that he is hiding a certain toy somewhere
where another child will not be able to find it. If simply looking at this child’s unsuccessful
task results, one would not have attributed false-belief comprehension to him. However, his
tendency to conceal toys from other children suggests otherwise. In these hiding situations,
he has privileged knowledge about where the toy is concealed, much like the privileged
knowledge in the false-belief task. He clearly understands that when he moves a toy to
another spot, there is crucial information that the other child is not privy to and will therefore
be unsuccessful if they try to look for the toy in its original spot. Other standard false-belief
tasks like Change in Location employ this very kind of awareness (Saracho, 2014b; Wimmer
& Perner, 1983). Perhaps Dunn’s observations of children’s notably “mature” behavior in
disputes or emotionally vivid situations apply here. We might consider the notion that his
awareness of false belief could be present in some situations and not others. In these hiding
situations, he is anxious about other children taking the toys he wants to use. It seems that the
child might be better able to employ an understanding of false belief in a situation in which
he is emotionally invested, even though this understanding did not seem available to him
during the task (Dunn, 1991).

Discussion of Task and Observations Results
While there is some variation in the results presented here, the implication is that
children under the age of three are less likely to comprehend a verbal false belief task. The
task results illuminate an overwhelming inability to succeed on a false-belief task at this age.
However, what many of these results do not represent is an awareness of mental states that
has not yet reached the threshold of false-belief comprehension or at least some kind of
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linguistic expression of it. Yet, the task results of this group of children do not explain the
very same children’s daily behavior. This suggests that they have an awareness of mental and
emotional states that is not represented by the task results.
The children seem to be already aware of and engaging with mental states and
perhaps even some subconscious understanding of false belief. In the spirit of being aware of
the limitations of naturalistic observations, I turn to Frye and Moore: “they are at least
suggestive of sensitivity on the part of the young preschooler to the existence of mental
life” (1991, p. 7). After all, some research has shown that three-year-olds are likely to choose
“mental descriptions” versus behavioral ones when describing images (Meltzoff, 2000). One
would describe an image of a bunny looking down at the ice cream that dropped on the floor
in one of two ways. One will either say something akin to ‘the bunny is [sad] about dropping
the ice cream’ — emphasis on an emotional state — or ‘the bunny is looking at the ice cream
on the floor’ — emphasis on a behavior. Meltzoff suggests that three-year-olds will tend
toward the former. Indeed, from what I observed, the quality of the descriptions children used
to talk about people and situations are consistent with his claim. This makes the task results
seem misaligned with the apparent awareness of perspective characteristic of the children in
the classroom context outside of the task. In light of the combined results, the question that
begs to be asked is, if young children do have some possession of theory of mind and
comprehension of false belief at a young age, then why might children fail on a verbal falsebelief task like this one?
The observations could be indicative of varying degrees of mental insight that evolve
over time and development. Similar to the ideas of Frye and Moore, Jean Briggs’
interpretation of the different kinds of human awareness might provide some explanation.
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I assume that any person “knows” in a variety of modes —that is, experiences
different kinds of awareness; that awareness constitutes a continuum and so may
exist in different degrees; and that awareness fluctuates, so that a person may be
distinctly aware of a motive, an emotion, a wish in one mode or at one moment in
time and less aware, or not aware at all, in a different mode or at another moment.
(Briggs, 1998, p.16)
The idea that awareness fluctuates or exists on a sort of spectrum and depends on the
variables of a particular moment in time might be helpful. This paradigm provides another
possible explanation for the variation in success on implicit and verbal false-belief tasks with
young children. It would require one to assume the notion that theory of mind and falsebelief comprehension do not activate in all perspective-taking situations at the flick of a
switch. They do not appear at some precise point in development, but rather become
increasingly applicable and available to more and more life situations as a child goes through
life.
Similarly, De Bruin (2014) suggests that these kinds of tasks only account for
conscious theory of mind mechanisms but that these processes are only accessible to the
children subconsciously. This would make it difficult, indeed impossible, for the child to
apply language to what they are not consciously processing. This is a possible explanation
for the perplexing task results of Children 6 and 7 who both seem to have some
comprehension of false belief but who clearly are capable of expressing this awareness in
different contexts. Indeed, what is perhaps most intriguing about this study is the difference
in participant results, namely those of Children 6 and 7.
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Child 7 seems to exhibit an understanding of false belief in the classroom when the
integrity of his toys, exclusive play space and other play needs are particularly vulnerable.
This vulnerability is hard to avoid in a room full of two-year-olds. For him, these are
significant emotionally-charged instances, which could activate the child’s more “mature”
intelligence, as Dunn suggests, but on a level that might not be available to the child in all
situations. Alternatively, unlike play, the task presents a situation that is completely
hypothetical and removed from the immediate context of the present classroom activity or
real-time social situation like the ones Dunn and Winner described. Perhaps the accessibility
of false-belief is tied to his personal emotional investment, the immediacy of the situation,
and the risk that is involved. This would imply that his emotional investment on the falsebelief task was relatively low. It did not invoke his need to stake a claim to toys nor his
tendency to conceal the whereabouts of those toys from the other children. Moreover, I (a
teacher) was leading the exchange, which, while making it more impersonal, could have
added to the implicit ‘safety’ of the situation, and thus might not have sparked the need to
employ this kind of social intelligence. The context of play might also be worth considering
as play is a common language and familiar setting for these children. Perhaps his
understating of false belief was able to be translated in a playful context and not through that
of the contrived task.
I also do not think that the diverging social tendencies of Child 6 and 7 are
coincidental and therefore should not be overlooked. As the development of theory of mind
and false belief seem to flourish in social settings — within family systems, interpersonal
discourse about mental states, linguistic exchanges in general and play — their social
behavior might be, at least in part, a focal point for understanding their perspective.
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Indeed, the results of the two children’s tasks are likely the product of more than one
variable and are, perhaps most importantly, inseparable from what the child him- and herself
brings to their interactions with the world. It is highly possible that there is a marked
difference in these children’s opportunities for explicit discourse about mental states using
mentalistic terms. It is also possible to consider the significance of family size, genetic
influence, social tendencies, language, personality and temperament, all of which are
variables that have been suggested throughout the literature as integral to the development of
theory of mind and false-belief comprehension in young children.
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4. Conclusion
Exploring the roots and developmental trajectory of theory of mind in young children
grounds our understanding of human sociability in the long run. Whether children arrive in
the world with certain predispositions to conceive of other perspectives or not, the
development and cultivation of these capabilities equip people with a powerful social tool.
Research that focuses on the connection between theory of mind, false-belief understanding
and sociability later in life convincingly emphasizes the need to pay special attention to this
area of social and cognitive development.
The definition and theoretical lens that are used to consider theory of mind in young
children change the way that we understand its existence. While false belief has been the
historical marker of a child’s coherent possession of theory of mind, it seems that verbal tasks
like these only scratch the surface of what and perhaps more importantly how children are
conceiving of the internal states of other people. This is exemplified in my own findings and
in the findings of others whose research emphasizes other areas of child development to
support these claims. Research in imitation, intentionality, sharing affect and joint attention
point to the potential roots of theory of mind in infancy and other tasks suggest fledgling
false-belief understanding in children significantly younger than three. Even daily naturalistic
observations like the ones included here enrich what we know about theory of mind and false
belief in a way that contrived tasks might not be able to.
Despite its origins, it is clear that theory of mind evolves over time and development.
It has the potential to become more complex and more insightful as information about
people’s thinking increases. With this complexity comes an increasing mutuality between a
child and their social world. As the child begins to understand more about mental states,
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theirs and those of others, they are able to make more complex social inferences, engage in
and understand more nuanced social behaviors and even alter behavior based on these
understandings (e.g. Frye 1991; Meltzoff, 2000; Michlmayer, 2002;). What we know about
the beginnings of theory of mind is bound to the things that feed its progression. Several
major agents that nourish its development are attachment, family systems, discourse about
internal states, language and cooperative pretend play. It is not coincidental that each of these
represents one of many diverse social domains that require the child to be in tune with
another individual. These situations are opportunities for children to fine-tune their
interpretive skills. Those skills in turn contribute to more complex abilities, both pro and
anti-social in nature. While the capacity to share, predict, manipulate, infer or comprehend
mental states does not have inherent positive or negative social impact, this intelligence
allows human beings to achieve both sorts of goals. The ability to have insight into another’s
mental state using theory of mind is both predictive of prosocial skills in peer interaction
(Peterson et al., 2016), and linked to intelligent forms of bullying (Hughes & Leekam, 2004).
Therefore, theory of mind is a necessary but insufficient variable in the road to behavior that
is prosocial and, simply, kind. Otherwise stated, “Empathy grounds morality, but morality
goes beyond empathy” (Gopnik, 2010, p. 210). This gets at the heart of the different forms of
empathic responses and the social moves available to those with access to more or less social
information.
Part of the value of exploring the nature of mental-state awareness in young children
is in the consequent realization that children understand and are attuned to more than they are
usually given credit for. What we might find is that their processes of revealing all that they
are capable of is not readily accessible to adults who no longer remember their mental lives
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as infants or toddlers. Indeed the call for novel task procedures is not new, but it is important
to emphasize. We should not underestimate what we can learn from the mental lives of young
children, for they will be older children, adolescents, teenagers and adults equipped with a
mental insight deriving from early-life experiences and the power to act on those insights.
Indeed the deeper I dove into this work, the less convinced I was that the adult ability to infer
mental states was that much more coherent than the young child’s. Passing observations on
subway platforms, street corners, in grocery lines and train cars made it clear to me that while
adults may solidly understand that mental lives underlie behavior, the inferences that they
make and behavior they exhibit based on those insights are anything but consistent or
consistently accurate. We are prone to misread, misattribute, and misunderstand and the
tendency to apply our own “privileged” information to others is not at all lost with age.
Keeping this and the ideas presented in this thesis in mind, may we deeply consider our
abilities to be in-tune with one another and seek to better understand the power of our own
perspectives and the utterly distinct perspectives of others.
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